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I. Introduction 
 
One would probably expect that as a law student on the verge of graduating and 
beginning his career in legal practice, I would be filled with optimism and hope for what the 
future will bring.  On the contrary, a sluggish economy, tight job market, and the lurking 
presence of my financial backers, Citibank and the Federal Government, both of which will soon 
be demanding a return on their investment in my education, have evoked more trepidatious 
sentiment than optimistic eagerness.  There can be no doubt that coming to terms with this kind 
of reality is a task that law students and young attorneys in generations past have also had to 
overcome.  They, however, likely had the hope that one day they would pay off their loans, 
climb the ranks, and hold the coveted title of “partner”; indulging in all the perceived esteem, 
power, and wealth that attaches, to boost their morale while fighting through such trying times.  
It is safe to say that nothing is more motivating to law students and young attorneys than the 
dangling “partner” carrot.   
I now pose the question to law students and associates: Which do you prefer, the blue pill 
or the red pill? 1  Taking the blue pill will allow you to continue down your career path with the 
valuable motivation that the aspiration of making partner provides. The red pill may, or may not, 
rid you of this motivation, but will enlighten you as to the truth of what you might actually be 
chasing.   If you prefer the blue pill, then you should discontinue reading this article.  If you 
prefer the red pill, then continue reading and pay close attention.   
 
II. The Red Pill 
 
Having chosen the red pill, you will now be privy to the reality of what making “partner” 
actually entails.  Today’s partners at prestigious law firms do not take three-hour lunches or 
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leave early to play golf on Wednesday afternoons.  You will also not find them reclined in their 
plush, rustic leather office chairs with their feet atop their desks, shoes off, ties loosened, sleeves 
rolled up, snifter of scotch in one hand, Cuban cigar in the other, talking on speaker phone with 
their travel agents planning their next vacations.  This is the situation many young attorneys 
envision for themselves after fifteen or twenty years of dedicated practice with the law firm they 
call home.  A more accurate vision might be one of them working the 8:00 to 8:00 shift, stained 
ties thrown over the back of their chairs, half-eaten lunches precariously set atop stacks of unread 
case law, feet firmly on the ground while frantically searching for new ways to build their book 
of business and increase their bottom line, lest the firm guillotine cut off their expensive and 
easily replaced head.   
So partners work more today2, big deal right?  After all, by the time law students reach 
graduation, they realize the career path they have chosen is very demanding; nobody thinks the 
rewards of making partner will come easy.  Still, with hard work, determination, and a little luck, 
when the dream of making partner is finally realized, it comes with the typical benefits, right? 
Partners still get peace of mind and gratification in the form of firm control, job security, and 
their fair share of firm profits, right?  The answer lies somewhere between not necessarily and 
probably not.  A case pending before the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois, EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood3, illustrates the disheartening reality that partners 
at many law firms today are being denied the benefits typically associated with the position of 
partner while still being subjected to the typical partner liabilities and downfalls.  Specifically, 
while partners might not have any substantial control within a firm or receive their fair share of 
firm profits, they might also not be protected from age, race, and gender discrimination due to 
their technical designation as “partner.”   
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First, this paper will take a look at the new breed of “partner” that exists within many top 
law firms today.  Then, the history, facts, and legal issues of the pending Sidley Austin case will 
be presented, followed by an analysis of the legal arguments that were advanced by both Sidley 
Austin and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on the same legal issue 
presented in a closely related 7th Circuit Court case decided in 2002.4  Also, the law applicable to 
the facts and legal issue in Sidley Austin has been changed by the recent Supreme Court case, 
Clackamus Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells5.  Therefore, an analysis of Clackamus 
and the application of its holding to Sidley Austin will be conducted, followed by the predicted 
outcome based on that application.  Finally, the implications and ramifications of the Sidley 
Austin case will be discussed. 
 
III.   The Role of “Partner” in Today’s Law Firm 
 The role of a “partner” in today’s law firms is not what it used to be.  One illustration of 
this change is the growing trend of law firms creating a second tier of non-equity partners, or 
“artners” (with “p” removed to symbolize the lack of rights to share in profits).6  These partners 
have little or no control within the firm and may not be compensated based on the firm’s 
financial success.7  Furthermore, while one might expect that non-equity “artners”, who have not 
contributed the stifling sums of money to firm capital that equity partners have, would not have 
significant control within the firm, the fact is that even the equity partners may only have illusory 
control.8  
Why has this change occurred?  Well, the creation of the two-tier partner system, as well 
as the decreasing degree of control that most equity partners have over law firm operations, is a 
product of the changing economic environment and, more specifically, the changing degree of 
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susceptibility that organizations providing legal services have to that environment.9  Other 
business organizations which do not provide professional services like accounting, medical, or 
legal services, have had to adjust to changes in the economic environment in order to merely 
survive, let alone thrive, for quite some time now.  Thus, nimble adaptability has become an 
absolutely essential function for almost any business.  At one time, the relationship between 
employee and employer was characterized by a sense of loyalty to one another.  It was not 
uncommon for an employee to spend thirty or more years working for the same company.  But 
changing economic forces, such as the ever expanding global economy, have created a 
relationship between employer and employee characterized by temporariness.  Corporate 
America and the general public have come to accept the cut-throat employment practices 
necessitated by achieving a highly adaptable business structure.   
Law firms, however, have traditionally been largely immune from external economic 
forces due to the legislatively created monopoly that law firms enjoy.  Thus, the nimble 
adaptability, or the ability to change even at a snail’s pace for that matter, has not been a 
characteristic shared by law firms generally.  Legislatures have created laws which intensely 
restrict entry into the legal services market and strictly prohibit the unauthorized practice of law.  
This is a result of the determination by legislatures that attorneys are “professionals” who offer 
services that are paramount to the function of society and require increased skill and 
competency.  This legislatively created immunity has allowed law firms to thrive without 
adaptation and without improved efficiency.  For instance, in the past, although businesses in 
other industries underwent of severe layoffs, downsizing, and various mergers and acquisitions 
necessitated by economic conditions, it was very rare to hear about law firms undergoing similar 
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restructuring.10  The immunity from external economic forces that law firms once enjoyed, 
however, has past.11   
Today, law firms are finding that the economic forces at work today are simply too robust 
to ignore and they, like businesses hoping to stay competitive in other industries, must operate 
with increasing efficiency to be successful.  In fact, the necessity for other businesses to operate 
efficiently is largely responsible for law firms now having to operate more efficiently.  While 
businesses may have looked at other ways to cut costs in the past, intense competition in their 
respective markets has caused them to leave no stone unturned when trimming expense fat.  
Because businesses can have substantial legal expenditures, they have begun “shopping around 
their legal work out to the best bidder” to decrease those expenditures.12  Thus, while there was 
once a sense of loyalty between clients and attorneys, that loyalty, like the loyalty between 
employers and employees, has evaporated.  Unfortunately, for the partners who once rode on the 
backs of overworked young associates, this means that even they might find their head on the 
chopping block if they do not contribute significantly to the firm’s bottom line.13  This is a threat 
to both “artners” and equity partners alike.14   
 There is nothing inherently wrong with any business “ruthlessly pursuing the bottom 
line”, however, law firms, in doing so, lose their professional distinctiveness and may become 
“de facto corporations”.15  Many law firms today are even abandoning the partnership business 
model altogether and incorporating as professional corporations or reorganizing as other types of 
business entities that have become allowable by recently enacted state laws.16  These “de facto 
corporations” have essentially been able to get the benefits of corporate status, namely limited 
liability and a free pass by society to implement crude employment practices as a matter of 
economic necessity, without being subjected to the rigors of the corporate form, namely strict 
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adherence to state and federal antidiscrimination statutes.  The justification for exempting law 
partners from liability for discriminating against one another based on age, sex, or race, has been 
that partners play a unique role as owners and operators of law firms.17  But, as the foregoing 
discussion illustrates, partners’ roles have changed.  As law firms begin to more closely resemble 
corporations, and partners begin to more closely resemble employees, they lose their 
distinguishing professional characteristics.  This renders the justifications for legislatively 
created economic immunity and, more importantly, justifications for exemption from 
antidiscrimination statutes and other corporate regulations invalid.18  The growing disparity 
between the partner’s perceived, or traditional role, and their actual role, has become so blatant 
that, as Sidley Austin illustrates, courts can no longer turn a blind eye in good conscience.   
 
IV.   EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood  
A. Background 
 With over 900 attorneys, more than 400 of whom were partners, The Chicago based law 
firm of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood was the 8th highest grossing firm in the county in 1998.19  
It was no exception to the growing trend seen in law firms today and in the late 1990’s; after a 
new management team took control of the firm, it began to trim their partner fat.20  In a plan to 
improve the firm’s financial performance, Sidley Austin demoted thirty-two of their lower 
performing “partners” from equity partners to “senior counsel” or “counsel.”21  These demotions 
eventually became the subject of acrimonious litigation, which today, almost 10 years later, is 
still in the discovery phase.  As could be expected, every major law firm in the country is waiting 
to see what happens.   
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 The facts of the case begin to take shape in 2000 when the EEOC opened a formal 
inquiry to determine whether Sidley Austin had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA) by demoting the thirty-two “partners”.22  The ADEA makes it unlawful for 
employers to discriminate against employees on the basis of age23 and the EEOC believed that 
Sidley Austin might be looking to age as a factor when deciding whom to demote.  The EEOC 
served Sidley Austin with a subpoena duces tecum requesting all information relevant to their 
decision to demote the partners.24  Sidley Austin provided most, but not all, of the information 
requested.25  It contended that all of the documentation necessary for the EEOC to determine that 
the partners were “real” partners was produced to them, and thus, the EEOC had “no basis to 
continue the investigation.”26  The EEOC then applied to the District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois for full enforcement of the subpoena.  The District court ordered that Sidley 
Austin was to comply fully with the EEOC’s subpoena, including requests relating to the merits 
of the discrimination claim.27  Sidley Austin then appealed that decision to the Seventh Circuit 
and received a partly favorable ruling.  The Seventh Circuit held that Sidley Austin did not have 
to produce documents to the EEOC relevant to the merits of the discrimination claim, but that 
they did have to produce documents to it relevant to the determination of whether the “partners” 
should be classified as “employees”, an issue that would determine whether the EEOC had 
jurisdiction over the matter.28 
 After the subpoena issues were settled by the 7th Circuit Court, and after another three 
years of investigation, the EEOC determined that the “partners” were properly classified as 
“employees” under the ADEA and were thus protected from age discrimination.  The EEOC 
filed an age discrimination lawsuit against Sidley Austin with the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois in 2005.29  The court will eventually have to make a decision as 
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to whether the demoted partners are, in fact, “employees” under the ADEA.  Sidley Austin’s 
Partnership Agreement governs the relationship amongst partners within the firm and will be an 
essential evidentiary document in the case.   
  
B. Sidley Austin’s Partnership Agreement  
 While partners at other top law firms may still have the traditional rights and powers that 
partners had during the “golden age”30, the vast majority of partners at Sidley Austin, including 
the thirty-two demoted partners, have very little control within the firm.  That model is 
representative of the growing trend in many law firms today.  This is due to the control structure 
mandated by Sidley Austin’s Partnership Agreement.  The Partnership Agreement establishes a 
thirty-four member Executive Committee that governs virtually every aspect of the firm’s 
operations.31  The “Executive Committee” is “charged under the Partnership Agreement with ‘all 
Partnership governance, including determination of salaries, expenses, Partners’ participations in 
Partnership profits and losses, required Minimum Balances of Partners, investment of 
Partnership funds, designation of Counsel, and admission and expulsion of Partners’ . . . .”32  
This provision implies that partners not serving on the Executive Committee do not have control 
over these matters.  The ability to exercise control over these matters, however, epitomizes the 
kind of powers that partners traditionally had in the past; they are the defining powers of a 
partner. 
 One might make the argument that the absolute control given to the Executive Committee 
was simply for practical reasons and point out that it would be highly impractical for a firm as 
large as Sidley Austin to take a vote every time a decision needs made or an issue needed 
resolution.  But for this argument to hold water, the firm would at least have to operate in some 
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sort of democratic fashion; possibly holding periodic elections where the partners could vote-in 
members to the Executive Committee.  But this was not the case.  The Executive Committee 
was, in fact, a self-elected and self-perpetuated committee, making it impossible for any partner 
to become a member without the votes of those already on the Executive Committee.33  These 
circumstances effectively excluded any partner not already on the “Executive Committee” from 
exercising any substantial control within the firm and from even having a meaningful voice.  
Therefore, Sidley Austin’s control structure is more akin to a dictatorship than a partnership.34  
In fact, “partners can and do go through entire careers in the firm without ever having their vote 
solicited, cast or counted” on any matter at all.35  In order to determine the degree of power that 
any one partner at Sidley Austin has, one need not inquire into such matters as number of years 
the partner has been with the firm, or the amount of hours worked, or how engaged in firm 
politics the partner is.  The only question that need be asked is whether that partner is on the 
Executive Committee.  If the answer is yes, that partner is one of few that have absolute and total 
control since the Executive Committee is the employer if the answer is no, that partner has 
virtually no control at all.   
 
C. Parties’ Legal Arguments in EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown &Wood (2002) Based On 
Controlling Law Before the Holding in Clackamus v. Gastroenterology Associates v. 
Wells  
 
The ADEA, like other Federal antidiscrimination statutes, provides protection against 
discrimination in an employment relationship context only to those individuals who are deemed 
“employees” or “potential employees.” Those who are deemed “employers” are not protected. 36  
This fact makes the court’s preliminary determination of the individual’s status as an employee 
every bit as significant as the ultimate question of whether the individual was actually 
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discriminated against.  The court’s determination that a plaintiff is not an employee is fatal to the 
plaintiff’s cause of action.   
Looking to the definition of “employee” found in the ADEA provides little, if any, 
guidance in the determination of “employee” status.  The ADEA, as well as the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) and Title VII, define “employee” as “an individual employed by any 
employer.”37  The circuity of this definition renders it practically useless for purposes of 
determining who is, or is not, an employee, hence the voluminous litigation attempting to 
interpret it.   
Courts have struggled to reach a consensus on what criteria should be used to determine 
whether an individual is an “employee.”  The courts have found it particularly difficult to 
determine the employee status of “partner’s”.  Some courts have held that the determination that 
an individual is a “partner” necessitates a determination that he or she is also not an employee.38  
For instance, in Wheeler v. Hurdman, the court stated that although “there may be aspects of a 
partner’s work environment in a partnership which are indistinguishable from that of a corporate 
employee . . . in general the total bundle of partnership characteristics sufficiently differentiates 
between the two to remove general partners from the statutory term ‘employee.’”39  The holding 
was based on the fact that the plaintiff had “participation in profits and losses, exposure to 
liability, investment in the firm, partial ownership of firm assets, and [] voting rights.”40  Other 
courts have rejected the per se approach in favor of looking at the actual role of the “partner” and 
determining whether that role is similar to more traditional ownership roles.41  The arguments 
made by Sidley Austin and the EEOC lie at these two ends of the spectrum, respectively. 
Sidley Austin argues the existence of three “undisputed” facts is legally determinative as 
to the issue of the demoted partners’ status as “non-employees.”42  These facts are (1) that the 
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partners own the firm by having contributed capital; (2) that the partners share in the profits of 
the firm and are liable for the firm’s financial losses and financial obligations; and (3) that all of 
the partners can bind the firm and that “virtually” all of the partners administer the firm by 
serving on one or more of the firm’s twenty-five management committees and administrative 
committees.43  Sidley Austin asserts that “[n]o court has ever found a partner in a professional 
partnership to be a covered employee where (as here): the partner shared in the profits and losses 
of the firm and was liable for the partnership’s debts; the partner contributed significant capital; 
and the partner could bind the firm and had management/supervisorial [sic] responsibilities.”44  
While this assertion may generally be true, the facts in this case are distinguishable from the 
facts of the cases upon which Sidley Austin relies as persuasive authority for this assertion.  
Furthermore, the “undisputed facts” are “vigorously disputed” by the EEOC.45   
The first “undisputed” fact is that the demoted partners had an ownership interest in the 
firm.  This is evidenced by existence of each partner’s capital account, which averaged 
$385,552.46  Sidley Austin points out that as owners, the partners have access to, and the right to 
inspect, the firm’s financial documents.  Sidley Austin also notes that the partners pay their own 
individual self-employment taxes.  Even Sidley Austin, however, does not argue that this fact 
alone determines the issue of “employee” status.  For instance, one can be an “employee” of a 
corporation and own stock in the corporation at the same time.  Also, for purposes of tax law, 
courts look to “substance over form” when determining the correctness of one’s elected tax 
status.47  The fact that the demoted partners are filing tax returns as “self-employed” individuals, 
however, does not mean they are, in fact, self-employed.  
The second “undisputed” fact posited by Sidley Austin is that the partners share in the 
firm’s profits and losses.  This is illustrated by Sidley Austin’s compensation system.  Under this 
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system each partner is assigned a set number of units and/or percentages, which are re-
determined every year.48  Each partner’s yearly compensation is then computed in accordance 
with his or her assigned units and/or percentages.49  Sidley Austin argues that this means each 
partner’s compensation is based upon the financial success of the firm and that the “ultimate 
responsibility for any financial loss will rest with all Sidley partners”.50  The EEOC, however, 
did not find the fact that the demoted partners’ income depends “somewhat upon the firm’s 
profitability” to be compelling.51  The EEOC reasoned that because the compensation of each 
non-Executive Committee partner is ultimately determined solely by the Executive Committee, 
the partners were, in effect, getting paid a salary.52  It is a stretch for the EEOC to correctly 
characterize the partners’ compensation as a salary.  “Salary” is defined as a “fixed 
compensation for services, paid periodically”53, but the partners’ amount of compensation was 
not fixed, only their percentage was fixed.54  By the EEOC’s reasoning, even two partners who 
mutually agreed to pay themselves each 50% of a firm’s income would be getting a “salary” 
because each partner is getting a fixed percentage, but this would be an incorrect conclusion.  
Still, the fact that the partners’ percentages are determined solely by the Executive Committee is 
crucial.   
The EEOC cites E.E.O.C. v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc. as persuasive authority for its 
contention that when an individual’s compensation is based on a percentage of profits that is 
determined by an authoritative evaluation of superiors, that is evidence the individual is an 
“employee” under the ADEA.55  In the Johnson case, owner-directors of a private corporation 
who continued to conduct employee like activities within the firm and who had compensation 
based on a certain “percentage of the firm's profits determined annually by the Directors' 
Compensation Committee” were held to be “employees” for purposes of the ADEA.56  Like 
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Sidley Austin’s Executive Committee, the members of the “Director’s Compensation 
Committee” were solely responsible for appointing new members to the Committee.  The 
Johnson case is distinguished in that it involved owner-directors in a private corporation, not 
partners in a partnership.  While the roles of shareholder-directors and partners can be very 
similar, and while these two positions have often been analogized in prior cases, this distinction 
effectively precluded the case from being on all fours for the EEOC.      
The third “undisputed fact” posited by Sidley Austin is that the partners “participated” in 
the administration of the firm through their service on one of the twenty-three “administrative 
committees”, each of which “is empowered to reach decisions and to act in carrying out its 
delegated functions.”57  Each administrative committee, however, serves at the pleasure of the 
Executive Committee.58   Sidley Austin states that “almost all” of the thirty-two demoted 
partners served on an administrative committee.59   
Sidley Austin glosses over their own admission that almost all of the thirty-two demoted 
partners served on an administrative committee.”  This begs the question: What about those 
partners that do not serve on an administrative committee?  What participation in the 
“administration” of the firm do they take?  Sidley Austin does not address this issue.  Sidley 
Austin simply maintains that the “advice and factual input from individual partners is sought as a 
matter of routine.”60  For argument’s sake, it will be assumed that all of the partners actually 
served on one or more administrative committees.   
Sidley Austin asserts that, 
[e]ach and every partner (but only a partner) is empowered to sign opinion letters. 
Sidley partners hire new associates and other employees. Sidley partners enter 
into contracts on behalf of the firm. Sidley partners have negotiated and signed 
contracts with clients for equity ownership in their business in payment or partial 
payment for firm legal services. Sidley partners have negotiated the terms of and 
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signed agreements for services by investment advisory consultants in connection 
with investment of employee and partner-pension moneys.61 
 
Assuming, arguendo, that the non-Executive Committee partners have this degree of 
control, this falls short of the degree of control necessary for Sidley Austin to prevail in this case.  
Literally every case upon which Sidley Austin relies as persuasive or controlling authority to 
support their proposition that this degree of control, combined with the other two “undisputed 
facts”, is determinative to the issue of “employee” status, can be factually distinguished on the 
basis of control.62  Sidley Austin does not cite even one case where a partner or director-
shareholder of a professional corporation has been held to be an “employer” (and thus not an 
“employee”) when they do not have the ability to exercise voting rights on at least some 
mandatory issues, or,at very least, the right to vote in the election of who will have ultimate 
control.  Sidley Austin’s Partnership Agreement explicitly and unequivocally states that “[e]ach 
partner shall, on all matters related to the affairs of the Partnership, be subject to the direction 
and control of the Executive Committee.”63   
In fact, the only action referred to by Sidley Austin in any of their pleadings that is not 
determined solely by the Executive Committee is the expulsion of a partner.64  This is implied by 
Sidley Austin’s statement that expulsion of a partner requires a “majority vote of those holding 
percentage interests in the partnership”.65  The EEOC aptly points out, however, that “it is 
undisputed that Executive Committee members always hold a majority of percentages and that 
they alone assign such percentages.”66  The EEOC argues that this fact, combined with the fact 
that non-Executive Committee members have absolutely no right to vote in the election of 
members to the Executive Committee67, renders any apparent control of non-Executive 
Committee members completely illusory and, thus, Sidley Austin’s implication is misleading.68    
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Remarkably, it seems that Sidley Austin is advocating the application of a standard for 
determining “employee” status under which the demoted partners would clearly be deemed 
“employees”.  Sidley Austin never attempts to address the distinguishing factors pointed out by 
the EEOC, namely partner voting rights on mandatory subjects and Executive Committee 
elections.69  In fact, not only does Sidley Austin fail to address this glaring distinction, but it also 
shamelessly asserts in one pleading filed with the District Court that “matters of ultimate 
partnership governance have been delegated to the Executive Committee” and “Sidley generally 
does not make its decisions based on a vote of the partners” in one pleading filed with the 
District Court. 70  The statement that the firm “generally” does not take a vote is misleading 
because it implies that, at least on some occasions, decisions are made based on a vote of all the 
partners.  This is not the case and, in fact, prior to the EEOC commencing its investigation, a full 
partnership vote had never been taken on any decision at Sidley Austin.71   
While Sidley Austin never addresses the partners’ lack of voting rights, they do refute the 
validity of what they mischaracterize as the EEOC’s “domination theory” argument.72  Sidley 
Austin uses three pages of one pleading filed with the District Court to cite cases that have 
rejected this “domination theory” as grounds for finding an individual to be an “employee.”73  
All of the cases cited hold that the “domination” of control over partners within a firm or 
director-shareholders within a professional corporation, do not necessarily mean that those 
individuals are “employees.”74  The problem with Sidley Austin’s application of these holdings 
to the case at bar is the context in which “dominance” is referred to by the cited cases.  In each 
case, the individuals at the least had voting rights over some aspects of firm governance or the 
election of the “dominating” entities.75  Sidley Austin, again, glosses over the fact that the 
partners have essentially no control and no voting rights.  
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D. 7th Circuit Court’s Legal Analysis in EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood (2002) 
The majority opinion starts the analysis by noting that Federal antidiscrimination laws do 
not exempt partnerships from coverage.76  Neither does the fact that the demoted individuals 
were partners necessarily mean that they were “employers.”77  The Court acknowledged Sidley 
Austin’s argument that partners could be classified as employers rather than employees because 
under partnership there are “effective remedies against oppression by their fellow partners, 
because partnership relations would be poisoned if partners could sue each other for unlawful 
discrimination, and because the relation among partners is so intimate that they should be 
allowed to discriminate, just as individuals are allowed to discriminate in their purely personal 
relations.”78  The court stated, “this was not the occasion to come down on one side or the other 
of the issue.”79   
The Court analogized the demoted partners to executive-level employees at corporations 
and noted that employee shareholders of a professional corporation have been held to be 
employees, not employers, for purposes of Federal antidiscrimination law in some instances.80  
Accordingly, this meant that the demoted partners might also be employees. 
Finally, the court mentioned the glaring and undeniable fact that Sidley Austin failed to 
explicitly address even once in their pleadings: The Executive Committee is self-elected and 
self-perpetuating.  Sidley Austin’s only argument which, at most, grazed the voting rights issue, 
is their contention that the entire partnership, rather than the Executive Committee, had control 
over the firm due to the delegation of that authority by the Partnership Agreement, the terms of 
which every partner must explicitly agree to before they become partner.81  Presumably, Sidley 
Austin was contending that this one-time delegation of power should be viewed as evidentiary 
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support for the proposition that the partners had meaningful control rights, which was willingly 
given to the executive committee.  The Court found this “particularly unconvincing”82 and 
postulated that, using Sidley Austin’s reasoning, “if the people elect a person to be dictator for 
life, the government is a democracy rather than a dictatorship.”83  The Court apparently found 
this assertion to be a ridiculous assertion and, therefore, Sidley Austin’s “delegation” theory is 
flawed.  The Court noted that the partners do not elect members of the Executive Committee, 
thus, they simply “have no control, direct or indirect, over its composition.”84  Although this 
point was mentioned only once in the opinion, it seems to have been a pivotal point in the 
Court’s decision.   
The majority opinion did not provide a specific set of factors that are pertinent to the 
determination of “employer/employer” distinction.  The Court did, however, reject the fact that 
the individuals were “bona fide” partners under Illinois state law as a determinative 
consideration.  Because the issue of “bona fide” partner status under state law was disposed with 
so quickly, it would seem that it is not even a relevant consideration, but this is uncertain from 
the Court’s holding.   
 
E. 7th Circuit Court’s Holding of EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood (2002)  
The impact of the 7th Circuit Court’s holding in Sidley Austin on future cases is somewhat 
unclear.  What is clear is that the Court found that question of whether or not the demoted 
partners were “employees” under the ADEA had not been answered by the alleged “undisputed 
facts” and held that Sidley Austin must comply with the EEOC’s subpoenas to the extent 
necessary to answer that question.85  What is not clear is whether this holding meant that the 
demoted partners might not be, in fact, “real partners”, therefore opening up the possibility that 
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they are “employees”, or whether it meant that, even if the demoted partners are “real partners”, 
they could still be “employees.”86   
This lack of clarity is created by the flow of the Seventh Circuit Court’s majority opinion, 
written by Judge Posner.  First, he clarifies the legal issue.87   He states the issue as being 
whether the demoted partners were “employers”, rather than whether the demoted partners were 
“bona fide partners.”88  He then opines, “the two classes, ‘partners’ under state law and 
‘employers’ under Federal antidiscrimination, may not coincide.”89  He notes that there is no 
explicit partner exemption in Federal antidiscrimination legislation.90  After finding that Sidley 
Austin has taken all of the steps necessary under Illinois law to establish a partnership, and that 
the demoted partners are correctly classified as “partners” under Illinois partnership law, he goes 
on to state that “[a]n individual who is classified as a partner under state partnership law, might 
be classified as an employee for other purposes, including the purpose for which 
antidiscrimination law extends . . . .”91  Later, he states that the demoted partners “are, or were, 
partners but it does not follow that they were employers.”92   
At this point in the opinion, a reasonable person reading Judge Poser’s opinion might 
conclude that the determination of whether one is a partner, “bona fide” under state law or 
otherwise, is not determinative to the issue of whether he or she is an “employee” for purposes of 
Federal antidiscrimination law.  But that conclusion would be premature because Judge Posner 
then begins assessing the demoted partners’ “partneresque” relations to the firm, namely their 
financial liability to the firm.93  Then, he distinguishes a case, cited by the EEOC as being the 
most “factually similar” case available,94 on the grounds that the “partners” in that case were not 
“bona fide partners.”95  Finally, right before Judge Posner states the holding, he acknowledges 
Sidley Austin’s “respectable argument” that “it would be better if the courts and the Commission 
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interpreted the employer exclusion to require treating all partners as employers, with perhaps a 
narrow sham exception.”96  The sentence following this acknowledgment states, “[t]hese issues 
will become ripe when Sidley finishes complying with the coverage part of the subpoena.”97  
This statement implies that the issue of whether all “real partners” should be considered 
“employers” was either not ruled on, or not before the court.  Rather, he held “only that there is 
enough doubt about whether the 32 demoted partners are covered by the age discrimination 
law.”98   
Judge Posner’s opinion went to great lengths to make clear that the demoted partners 
were, indeed, “bona fide partners” under state law and that bona fide partner status is not 
dispositive as to the issue of “employer/employee” status.  At the same time, his opinion also 
assessed the “partneresque” characteristics of the demoted partners as criteria for the 
determination of “employer/employee” status.    One might inquire as to whether the 
determination of partner status, “bona fide” or otherwise, is at all relevant.  Is there a different 
definition of partner, perhaps under common law or using more traditional partner criteria, 
which would constitute “real partner” status and be conclusive to the determination of 
“employee” status?  All in all, it seems that while an individual’s status as “partner” under state 
law criteria is not even a relevant consideration to the determination of “employer/employee” 
status, the consideration of the individual’s “partneresque” qualities under more traditional 
partner criteria is relevant.  Presumably, this is simply because traditional partner characteristics 
coincidentally resemble the characteristics of an “employer”.  Thus, the determination of an 
individual as a traditional partner, or “real” partner, may be dispositive to “employer/employee” 
status, but only coincidentally.  Determination of an individual’s status as “partner” under state 
partnership law, on the other hand, is not relevant because partnership laws generally allow the 
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partners to divide risk, return, and control among themselves however they please.  Thus, partner 
status under state law is meaningless “as to what role any particular partner plays and, thus, 
whether the individual is an employee [under] the ADEA as well as a partner under state 
partnership law.”99  The conclusion that partner status, “bona fide”, “real”, or otherwise, is only, 
at most, coincidentally determinative to the issue of “employee” status, begs the question:  What, 
then, are the criteria for determining the “employee/employer” status of a partner?  
 
F. Application of holding in Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells to 
EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood  
Any uncertainty as to what factors are relevant to the determination of “employee” status 
for purposes of Federal antidiscrimination legislation might be cleared up by the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Clackamus Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells. 100  In that 
case the Supreme Court held purposes of determining whether a director-shareholder was an 
“employee” under the ADA and, thus, was protected against discrimination based on the 
existence of a qualified disability, the focus should be on the common law touchstone of 
control.101  The court officially endorsed a six-factor inquiry, proffered by the EEOC and 
outlined in their Compliance Manual, as being the relevant factors for determining whether a 
shareholder-director of a professional corporation was an “employee”.102  These six factors are: 
Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules and 
regulations of the individual's work; [w]hether and, if so, to what extent the 
organization supervises the individual's work; [w]hether the individual reports to 
someone higher in the organization; [w]hether and, if so, to what extent the 
individual is able to influence the organization; [w]hether the parties intended that 
the individual be an employee, as expressed in written agreements or contracts; 
[and] [w]hether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the 
organization.103 
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While no one factor is decisive, the court states that the “common-law element of control is the 
principal guidepost.”104 
Consideration of the court’s rationale in Clackamus should dispel any doubts as to 
whether that holding applies to the facts of Sidley Austin.  The two most feasible arguments for 
why it should not apply are that Clackamus considered the determination of “employees” in the 
context of the ADA and not the ADEA, and that the business entity in Clackamus was a 
professional corporation and not a partnership.  Each of these arguments, however, can be 
convincingly countered.   
First, the court explicitly “endorsed” the “EEOC’s standard”105, which, according to the 
EEOC, and acknowledged by the court in a footnote to the majority opinion, is a standard that 
applies “across the board to other federal antidiscrimination statutes”, including the ADEA.106  It 
is reasonable to assume that if the court intended to limit the endorsement of the EEOC’s 
standard for determining “employee” status to application solely under the ADA, it would have 
mentioned this limitation in the opinion.  Furthermore, the EEOC’s standard applies to 
“partners” because the EEOC Compliance Manual states that the factors are “factors to be 
considered with regard to coverage of partners, officers, members of boards of directors, and 
major shareholders.”107  Once again, if the court intended to endorse the EEOC’s standard only 
with regard to shareholder-directors and not partners, the court would have explicitly limited the 
endorsement in this case.   
Second, the court explicitly rejected an exemption for shareholder-directors on the 
ground that they were analogous to partners.108   The court articulated the rationale for rejecting 
this approach by stating, “today there are partnerships that include hundreds of members, some 
of whom may well qualify as ‘employees’ because control is concentrated in a small number of 
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managing partners . . . [t]hus, asking whether shareholder-directors are partners—rather than 
asking whether they are employees—simply begs the question.”109  Not only does this statement 
imply that the EEOC’s standard would also apply in the context of partnerships generally, but it 
implies application of that standard to exactly the same kind of situation as the demoted partners 
at Sidley Austin.   
If the holding in Clackamus is applicable to Sidley Austin, then the six-factor control test 
outlined in Clackamus must be applied.  In doing so, the factors are being applied to determine 
whether the demoted partners are “employees” and not whether other partners are employees or 
whether the firm is a true partnership.   
 
1. Factor 1: Did Sidley Austin hire or fire the demoted partners or set the rules 
and regulations of their work? 
There are two parts to this questoin.  First, the question is who makes the decision to hire 
and fire?  Do the demoted partners participate in the decision to hire and fire or does some other 
person or entity make that determination?  All evidence points to the conclusion that the 
Executive Committee had the ultimate authority regarding hiring and firing, and not the demoted 
partners.  While some of the demoted partners may have the ability to hire and fire 
subordinates110, they did not participate in decisions to promote or demote partners.  This is 
supported by the fact that there had never been a firm wide vote prior to the EEOC’s 
investigation.111  From all the available evidence, it appears that the decision to promote and/or 
demote partners was based on a majority vote of those holding percentages, which at all times, 
was held by the Executive Committee.112  The second question is who set the rules and 
regulations of the demoted partners’ work?  The evidence shows that these decisions were 
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explicitly within the province of the Executive Committee.  Because the demoted partners were 
not on the Executive Committee, and because they could not vote on the election of Executive 
Committee members, they are controlled by Sidley Austin.  The consideration of “factor 1” 
plainly weighs in favor of the EEOC.  
 
2. Factor 2: To what extent did Sidley Austin supervise the demoted partners’ 
work?  
The degree of supervision over the demoted partners’ work is not determinable with any 
certainty based on the facts gleaned from the documents available to the general public.  
Presumably, however, the demoted partners were not “supervised” heavily by anyone other than 
themselves.  They likely came in and out of the office and assessed the quality of their own 
work.  Also, the demoted partners likely supervised others, namely associates and secretaries, 
closely.  The consideration of “factor 2” weighs in favor of Sidley Austin.  
 
3. Factor 3: Did the demoted partners report to someone higher in the firm?   
Reporting in this context requires a hierarchy, i.e. laborer/foreman, teacher/principal, etc.  
At Sidley Austin, whether hierarchies between non-Executive Committee partners existed is a 
matter of interpretation.  The firm is administered, in part, by twenty-three Administrative 
Committees, each of which is delegated a specific administrative function and has its members 
appointed by the Executive Committee.113   Presumably, all of the partners at the firm must 
report to each Administrative Committee on matters related to that committee’s administrative 
function.  These committees, however, were composed of non-Executive Committee members, 
including most of the demoted partners, and were equally powerful in that each committee 
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oversaw one distinct aspect of the firm and was subject to the absolute authority of the Executive 
Committee alike.114  Thus, the issue of whether the partners reported to someone “higher” at the 
firm when they report to an Administrative Committee, is debatable.   
What is not debatable, however, is that a hierarchy does exist between the Executive 
Committee partners and non-Executive Committee partners.  This hierarchy is significant.  In 
fact, it seems to be the primary distinguishing feature between Sidley Austin and other smaller 
firms, which would probably not find themselves in a discrimination suit like this.  Presumably, 
the demoted partners were compelled to report to the Executive Committee on many aspects as a 
matter of necessity.  For instance, it has already been established that the Executive Committee 
determined each partner’s units, percentages, and guarantees.115  Obviously the Executive 
Committee had to base these determinations on some criteria that were likely reported to them by 
the partners.  Furthermore, it is commonsense that any governing body having absolute and total 
control over individuals in a competitive work environment such as this would require some 
form of reporting from time to time.  The consideration of “factor 3” weighs in favor of the 
EEOC. 
4. Factor 4: To what extent were the demoted partners able to influence the 
Executive Committee?   
This is a question that requires an analysis of detailed facts that are simply not available 
to the public at this point.   Sidley Austin does, however, claim that their “management 
philosophy is consensus-based decision making.  Sidley encourages individual partners to come 
forward with initiatives and ideas for addressing both external and internal relationships . . . 
[and] advice and factual input from individual partners is sought as a matter of routine.”116  The 
extent to which this is true is unknown and will likely be debated at trial.  One would expect that, 
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due to the absolute authority explicitly conveyed to the Executive Committee by the Partnership 
Agreement, Sidley Austin would need to present evidence showing that this claim is more than 
rhetoric.   
This factor weighs in favor of the EEOC, but only as a rebuttable presumption.  If Sidley 
Austin can show that actual deference is given to the Administrative Committees, then this factor 
may weigh in on its side.  Sidley Austin should realize, however, that it will hardly be 
compelling evidence if it merely shows that the Administrative Committees make independent 
decisions because a law firm the size of Sidley Austin must, as a matter of necessity, delegate 
duties and responsibilities to several decision making bodies.  To be compelling, the evidence 
must show that the Executive Committee gave genuine deference to the Administrative 
Committees regarding the firm’s most crucial issues.  For instance, two relevant considerations 
are how frequently the Executive Committee overturns a decision made by an Administrative 
Committees and what types of decisions, if any, are automatically deferred to the Executive 
Committee.  The consideration of “factor 4” presumptively weighs in favor of the EEOC. 
5. Factor 5: Did the demoted partners and Sidley Austin intend for the demoted 
partners to be employees, as expressed by any written agreements or contracts?   
The EEOC does not point to any document that expressly states or even implies anyone’s 
intention that the demoted partners be “employees”.  On the contrary, it is apparent from the 
Partnership Agreement and all other relevant documents that the intention of all parties involved 
was for the demoted partners to be “employers.”  This intention is implied by the fact that the 
legal issue presented in Sidley Austin, i.e. the issue of whether partners who have ownership in a 
law firm, share in the profits of a law firm, and, at least to some degree, administer the law firm 
may be “employees” under the ADEA, is relatively new.  It would be tough to convince a judge 
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or jury that the demoted partners considered themselves to be “employees.”  Furthermore, it is 
likely that the demoted partners would have even been insulted at the suggestion that they were 
“employees” rather than “employers.”  Any argument made by the EEOC that the demoted 
partners considered themselves to be “employees” would likely be rejected, however, because 
the Clackamus decision clearly stated that the factor be measured objectively.117  The 
consideration of “factor 5” weighs in favor of Sidley Austin.  
 
6. Factor 6: Did the demoted partners share in the profits, losses, and liabilities of 
Sidley Austin?  
The answer to this question is yes.  The demoted partners contributed substantial capital, 
were compensated based on firm profits, and were personally liable to the firm.  The EEOC’s 
argument that the demoted partners did not have control over the percentage of firm profits that 
they would receive, while pertinent to the general issue of control issue, is not compelling 
regarding this factor.  Consideration of “factor 6” weighs in favor of Sidley Austin. 
 
G. Predicted outcome of EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood (2005) regarding the 
issue of whether the demoted partners are “employees” under the ADEA. 
Application of the factors outlined in Clackamus leaves the EEOC and Sidley Austin tied 
with three factors weighing in for each.  It would seem, however, that the EEOC has an overall 
advantage when the general element of control is used as the principal guidepost.  The EEOC 
comes out ahead on the factors most closely related to common notions of control.  The EEOC’s 
advantage is evidenced by the fact that Sidley Austin has not made a motion for summary 
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judgment based on the issue of the demoted partners’ “employee” status.  It also appears that no 
such motion will be forthcoming.118   
What is left of the issue will be decided by a jury119  Although the general public tends to 
have an unfavorable disposition towards attorneys, I believe that a jury will sympathize with the 
demoted partners as individuals being oppressed by an unelected authoritative body.   The fact 
that the demoted partners were without without any substantial voting rights, even with regards 
to the election of the Executive Committee, will likely be the determining factor.  The virtue of 
democracy is an ideal instilled in almost all Americans and is, in fact, a cornerstone of the 
American spirit.  Americans generally believe that equal voting rights, at least on some issues, 
are a right, not a privilege or luxury.  Furthermore, while the legal issue of “employee” status 
should be considered independently of the alleged discrimination, the jury will likely find the 
proposition that an unelected body can legally discriminate against an individual based upon 
their age in any context to be offensive.  For the aforementioned reasons, it is the writer’s 
opinion that the jury will find the demoted partners to be “employees” under the ADEA.   
 
V. Tough Decision Ahead 
Sidley Austin is a case of first impression in that it considers, for the first time, the 
possibility that law firm partners having ownership interests, shares in firm profits and losses, 
and some degree of ostensible administrative control, may be protected under the ADEA and 
other Federal anti-discrimination statutes from illegal discrimination.  Hopefully, at least 
regarding sex and race discrimination, this should not be an earth shattering revelation for law 
firms because they should not be engaged in such invidious discrimination anyway, even if 
exempt.  Age discrimination, however, is a much more common practice for law firms through 
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the implementation of mandatory retirement policies.  This is likely more common due to the 
fact that age discrimination, for good or bad, is not as morally repugnant as sex and race 
discrimination; it is merely an out with the old, in with the new type of policy.  There may be 
well intended objectives behind such mandatory retirement policies, i.e. the firm wants to keep a 
more recently educated, technologically savvy, and “with the times” management team that 
might have fresher ideas and be less opposed to change.  The problem, however, like with most 
all discrimination based upon demographic criteria, is that it places great weight on stereotypes.  
It is quite possible for a seventy-five year old attorney to have kept up on his education and 
familiarized himself with technological innovations and modern marketing techniques more than 
a thirty-something attorney.  This is exactly the kind of situation that anti-discrimination 
legislation is intended to address.  Also, law firms may look at mandatory retirement as a way of 
making room so that the younger attorneys may have their turn occupying a top spot and getting 
a bigger chunk of the profits.120  Of course, there is no finite amount of partner positions, only 
finite profits, which the partners already enjoying those profits do not always want to share.         
Regardless of whether mandatory retirement is benign or malignant, it is barred by the 
ADEA for “employees.”  Sidley Austin causes every law firm with a mandatory retirement policy 
to reevaluate whether it should continue to implement that policy.  This evaluation will proceed 
in as many as two phases.  First, law firms must assess, using the Clackamus holding as 
guidance, whether their partners are “employees”.  This, of course, will force them to consider 
whether they have given their partners sufficient control/voting rights.  If they determine that all 
of their partners have sufficient control, then they are not subject to the ADEA and they may 
continue implementing their mandatory retirement policy as they were.  If there is doubt, 
however, then the firm must weigh the benefits of their mandatory retirement policy against the 
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benefits of withholding significant control from their “partners”.  Put another way, those that do 
have sufficient control within the firm must ask the question:  Is it more important to the success 
of our firm that we deny individuals having dedicated ten, twenty, or even thirty years of their 
lives to our firm any substantial right of control on every significant aspect of firm governance, 
or that we have the freedom of unbridled discrimination against those individuals on the basis of 
sex, race, and age?  This may be a cynical way of phrasing the question, but it seems accurate 
none the less.   
Interestingly, even after the 7th Circuit Court held that law firm partners may be 
“employees” under the ADEA and, thus, law firms may be subject to age discrimination liability 
for having mandatory retirement policies, for the most part law firms have maintained those 
policies.121  In fact, in 2005 a survey found that over 57% of law firms maintained their 
mandatory retirement policy.122  It seems that law firms are waiting on the Sidley Austin case 
before they start changing their policies. 
 
VI.   Conclusion 
Taking the “red pill” has brought to light a reality that has an upside and a downside.   
The downside is that the benefits and perks that were once considered a corollary to holding the 
position of partner cannot be presumed to exist in all law firms today.  Some law firms, typically 
the smaller ones, still grant the traditional benefits and control rights to partners.  But other law 
firms, typically larger ones with centralized management, may not afford their partners many 
benefits or control rights at all.  Also, partners are expected to work far many more hours a week 
today than they were in the past.  The upside, while probably not significant enough to neutralize 
the effect of the downside, is that partners who are substantially denied traditional partner 
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benefits may at least be able to seek refuge from discriminatory demotion practices and 
mandatory retirement policies which threaten their livelihood.  Only the most deprived partners, 
however, will have an opportunity to obtain such refuge.        
All factors considered, most partners simply do not have it as good as they used.  Even if 
the EEOC prevails in Sidley Austin and law firms change their policies, either by giving partners 
more control rights, or be ceasing mandatory retirement policies, this victory for the oppressed 
partner would probably be short lived.  In cases that follow Sidley Austin, the courts will apply 
the Clackamus factors to what will likely be a slew of ADEA cases against law firms charging 
illegal age discrimination.  Eventually, bright lines will drawn and law firms will know exactly 
how much control they have to give their partners in order to limit their discrimination liability.  
To remain competitive, external market forces will cause larger law firms to give partners as 
little control as possible without subjecting the firm to discrimination liability for maintaining 
mandatory retirement policies.  
In the past, making partner meant you had reached the top.  It meant that all your hard 
work, determination, and dedication for the last seven to twelve years, had culminated to produce 
the result for which you had strived.   Today, however, it may be unwise to put so much faith in 
attaining what may actually be a superficial title.  This, of course, does not mean that making 
partner is not a significant milestone or feat.  It also does not mean that the partner tree is 
completely fruitless.  It simply means that, in order to avoid demoralizing disappointment, law 
students and associates should be aware that making partner may only be a stepping stone on 
their legal career path.  For those law students and attorneys who took the red pill, they now 
realize the mountain they intend to climb might be twice as tall as they originally thought, but 
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they may take solace in knowing that they can now prepare themselves accordingly for the long 
climb ahead and they have an advantage over those of their colleagues who took the blue pill.  
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